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 A census is an example of the social construction of knowledge and the politics of 
measurement.  Measuring people assumes a political significance because it entails converting 
heterogeneous populations into numbers—stable pieces of knowledge that can be easily 
combined and manipulated.  In constructing such numerical representations, census officials 
claim to be creating an objective portrait of the population.  Censuses, however, also contribute 
to something less tangible by playing a key role in the creation of what Benedict Anderson has 
termed an “imagined community.”i  General censuses provide states with a unique opportunity to 
unify space and populations with a single instrument.  Furthermore, in their quest to secure a 
statistical portrait of what their polity “is” census officials shape the resultant outcome on the 
basis of categories derived from their own conceptions of what their polity has been.  Measurers’ 
agendas and biases become objectified in the construction of the census form, the creation of 
census categories, and the publication of census data.  The census-taking component of the 
imagining process is itself divided between central census administrators (those who create 
census forms, rules for their completion, etc.) and census workers in the field—local census 
authorities and enumerators whose own conceptions of what is being counted intrude into the 
interpretation of rules and the enumeration of people.  Ultimately, the numbers derived from the 
census process are used to reify or alter prior images of the polity and to evaluate, conceptualize 
and control. 
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At the same time, the census process contributes to the creation of imagined 
community/communities among the counted themselves.  By drawing individuals into a general 
process a census, like mass media, closes spatial and social distance by creating an opportunity 
for persons to imagine themselves as part of a larger whole that can be placed in similar 
categories.  Indeed, repeated censuses create what Anderson terms a “bound seriality”—a series 
of vignettes that together provide a population not only with a collective image of the present, 
but of the past and the future.
ii
  Furthermore, the standard census practice of self-identification 
provides an opportunity for the counted to express their own sense of  which official  categorical 
communities they belong to within the whole.  Censuses shape a sense of identity in the minds of 
the counted—either in terms of a population group’s sense of numerical (political) strength or in 
the sense of a cohesive group response to perceived mis-categorization by census-takers.  
Therefore, for all of its supposed objectivity, census taking is a political act that is inextricably 
linked to questions of power and identity (both individual and as part of an imagined 
community).
iii
  A historical understanding of the process of census taking is thus crucial to 
understanding the categories through which we view ourselves as human beings—both in the 
past and in the present. 
 Historians, demographers and social scientists, in search of a statistical foundation for 
their own research, have looked to the first general census of the Russian Empire as an important 
source of information.  As such, their discussion has focused on data quality and the 
methodological manipulations necessary to make them useful.
iv
  However, "the question of the 
accuracy of these data is relevant only when the census is approached as a source of information; 
the problem becomes largely irrelevant if the census is studied not as a data source for research 
into other subjects, but as the subject of research itself."
v
  Several studies have examined 
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Russia’s tax censuses (revizii) and the first general census of 1897 as administrative tools and 
sites of social interaction, but none have presented a comprehensive and empirical study of this 
topic.
vi
  Such a study is crucial to answering questions connected to identity in the late imperial 
period. 
From eighteenth-century attempts to catalogue the “other” to the Slavophile-Westernizer 
debates and the shock of discovering Russians assimilating into Siberian cultures, identity issues 
were nagging questions within the Russian Empire.
vii
  Many of the conflicts of the period 
centered on differences between the state’s shifting conception of the empire and the evolving 
identities of various groups in Russian society.  Past historiography has generally portrayed this 
as a one-way street—as the autocratic state working (largely unhindered except for periodic 
outbursts) to bring order to an unruly and diverse territory and largely failing (under-
government), or as an emerging “civil society” struggling to liberate itself from autocratic 
oppression.  The history of the first imperial census suggests something more complex—that the 
dialogue between competing images of the empire pointed toward a vision that was neither that 
of the state nor its opponents.  The census, as an official act, was a dialectic of social identity that 
gave both census-takers and subjects the opportunity to define and legitimate their interpretations 
of Russia’s socio-political organization.  
For purposes of space, this paper focuses on the census process from the census-takers’ 
perspective—that of state officials in St. Petersburg, local servitors, and volunteers.  Census 
categories provided the government with a means to construct society in “proper order,” and 
various groups in imperial society found these categories convenient (even if they had 
reservations about how they should fit into them).  From this perspective, the census appears as a 
means to legitimate the dynastic empire by using a single instrument to define the latter as a 
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single territorial entity with a single population (in Anderson’s words, stretching the “skin of 
nation” over the bulging body of empire).  It provided the first opportunity for nearly all 
inhabitants to do this simultaneously.  Given levels of literacy, and thus the diminished role that 
“print capitalism” could play among the population as a whole, this was perhaps the first way in 
which many could imagine themselves as people who shared the same larger space.
viii
  Emphasis 
on the census as a complete enumeration of the entire population positions the census as an 
attempt to create a sense of horizontal integration and legitimation (a sense of what Jürgen 
Habermas and Miroslav Hroch would call “ the public sphere” or “civil society”) while at the 
same time maintaining the vertical order of the dynastic empire.
ix
  Although Russia has been 
described (following Antonio Gramsci’s view that “In Russia the state was everything, civil 
society was primordial and gelatinous”) as a place where state and society were mutually 
exclusive entities, the census process suggests something more complicated.  The state could in 
fact construct civil society for its own purposes and, it did.
x
  From this perspective, the census 
can be placed within the context of the autocracy’s attempts to define “imperial citizenship” and 
within the context of its on-going attempts to rationally  “order” the empire to facilitate pursuit of 
an imperial agenda.
xi
  To investigate this we shall examine, first, the origins of the census project 
as a means of illustrating what the census meant to state officials.  A discussion of the way in 
which the census project attempted to create a sense of imperial citizenship and the confines of 
that citizenship follows.  The boundaries of citizenship (and the dilemma posed by geopolitical 
and cultural constraints) are illustrated with a number of examples from the census process itself. 
 
Why a Census? Origins, Context and Meaning 
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The 1897 census was not, of course, the Russian state’s first population enumeration.  
When seventeenth-century household taxes and military recruitment procedures proved 
inadequate for waging war in the early eighteenth century, the state instituted periodic censuses 
of the population liable for the new poll tax and military recruitment.  The first of these censuses 
of the taxable population, or revizii, took place in 1719-21 and the last (the tenth) was finished in 
1857/8.
xii
  By the time of the last revision, however, developments were already rendering this 
type of partial population enumeration obsolete.  As Academician and statistician P. I. Keppen, 
noted in his 1857 monograph, The Ninth Revision, such partial censuses failed to provide "either 
material for scientific conclusions, or other bases for the discussion of many legal and 
administrative questions which require information on the distribution of the entire population by 
age, social estate, religion, family position, tribe, literacy, occupation, and ability to work."
xiii
 
The idea of conducting one-day censuses of the entire population on a standard form 
reflected the “rise of statistical thinking”—a belief, fostered by the Belgian astronomer Adolphe 
Quetelet and others, that the compilation of mass data would ultimately yield general social laws 
or a “social physics.”  This mania for numbers became institutionalized in 1853 with the 
convocation of the first International Statistical Congress in Brussels.  The Brussels congress 
began compiling a standard census form, and subsequent congresses built on this work.  
Beginning in 1857, Russian representatives from the Imperial Russian Geographic Society 
regularly participated in these congresses.  This connection between the Statistical Congress and 
the reform-minded enlightened bureaucrats of the Geographic Society solidified these reform-
minded officials’ faith in data collection as a necessary tool for reforming and properly directing 
imperial society.  In 1860 the Geographic Society placed the idea of an empire-wide census on 
the public agenda by calling on all interested parties to submit census plans for a juried contest.  
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Several enlightened bureaucrats remained closely tied to proposals to carry out a census 
throughout the second half of the nineteenth century.  P. P. Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, who first 
attended a congress in 1863, ultimately became de facto chair of the Main Census Commission 
in 1895.  The 1897 census was thus in many respects a belated act of the Great Reform era.  
Some officials even suggested that the census be announced in the form of an imperial manifesto 
similar to that issued to proclaim the end of serfdom.
xiv
 
 Like the Great Reforms themselves, the census was necessary for the “correct direction of 
the state.”  The Interior Ministry’s preface to the census project it submitted for State Council 
approval in 1895 not only presented the census as a continuation of the state’s practice of 
counting its subjects, but specifically linked the revisions to Peter the Great’s reforms and 
accomplishments.  The Russian Empire could not hope to maintain its position without the 
ability to keep track of its subjects in terms of numbers and location.
xv
  As Semenov argued in a 
brief supporting the census project: 
All states of the enlightened world, both Old and New, have already long ago come to the 
full realization that for the correct direction of the state it is impossible to proceed 
without accurate information—not only on the general size of its population and its 
territorial distribution, but even more so on its composition by age, family make-up, 
religion, nationality, estate and occupation, literacy, etc.  …[A] proper population count 
can be founded only on the periodic production of one-day, state-wide censuses of the 
population by name….xvi 
 
The state could not fulfill its paternalistic function without relevant data, data that 
revisions of only those liable for the poll tax and conscription could not provide.  Knowledge-
based power would facilitate the practical demands of administration and, in turn, enhance the 
population’s well being.  Indeed, supporters of the census project argued that the possession of 
such data might have enhanced state performance during the 1891-92 famine years.  As one 
official pointed out, “the absence of any amount of satisfactory data on the size of the population 
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and especially its age distribution presented not a little difficulty for the correct establishment of 
government relief….”xvii  Having such data, the autocracy would surely serve its subjects better 
in the future.  Finally, as the Interior Ministry noted in a memorandum supporting passage of a 
census statute, “even parts of Asia where state administration is somewhat well-established” had 
managed to conduct censuses; the Russian Empire (by implication) would remain in the ranks of 
great powers only if it had vital information at its fingertips.  After all, a general census "had 
even been carried out in India."
xviii
 
More specific concerns also strengthened this association between statistics, control and 
autocratic paternalism.  The process behind the 1861 serf emancipation the Empire’s servile 
population revealed to officials a dearth of important data on the lives of the Empire’s majority 
peasant population.  As Interior Minister Tolstoi noted in his September 1882 petition for the 
Emperor’s support of a census project, the census was a "dire necessity" as such figures would 
provide a basis for the peasantry's redistribution of allotment lands between households and for 
the correct assessment of state and local taxes.
xix
  Indeed, because peasant practice connected 
past revisions to the repartition of communal land, Tolstoi argued, the absence of a population 
count since the Tenth Revision was a key factor sustaining the peasantry’s “vain hopes for an 
additional [land] allotment.”  At the same time, a soslovie-based population count would also 
cause rural disorder because of its association with tax levies.
xx
  Maintenance of rural social and 
economic stability thus required a census of the entire population. 
The military reform of 1874 provided an even more compelling reason for conducting a 
complete census of the entire population.  The reform required that the population be considered 
as a whole, without distinction between social estate, by making all twenty-one year old males 
subject to conscription.  The revisions thus only accounted for part of the draft-age population.  
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This, combined with a new reserve system, required that the government have some idea of how 
many males would be eligible for service each year.  In addition, omissions in the revisions and 
their infrequent nature meant that they were less than an ideal basis on which to calculate the 
defense of the empire.  As Semenov later noted, "Unfortunately, revisions, as population counts, 
do not withstand even the most lenient criticism."  The revisions 
did not provide answers for the most important questions connected to the composition of 
the population; they did not transfer to anywhere any basic material for statistical 
analysis, even important information such as the age distribution of the population....  For 
this reason, when the question of how many persons in Russia would reach the age of 
twenty-one each year arose in connection with the law project on military obligations no 
one could provide an answer.
xxi
 
 
 The temporary rules for discovering the number of draft-age individuals also proved 
unsatisfactory.  Between 1878 and 1882 the government attempted to register and count those 
subject to military service by compiling family lists (semeinye spiski).  For the taxable estates, 
this was done on the basis of extrapolations from lists compiled as a part of the Tenth Revision; 
other estates were asked to submit this information voluntarily.  Semenov explained the situation 
in greater detail.  The government calculated the size of the taxable population for 1874 as a base 
year by multiplying figures from the Tenth Revision by the rate of population growth.  This put 
the entire process on an imprecise footing, especially as each provincial statistical committee 
carried out the revision, calculated the rate of population growth and extrapolated differently.  
Initial inaccuracies were then multiplied with each passing year.
xxii
  Besides this problem, 
Semenov noted, the family lists compiled in the period 1873-1889 were also highly suspect 
because they were regularly corrected only for families having draft-age sons.  Thus, "one family 
on the list was registered as it was in 1873, another as it was in 1878, a third as in 1882, a fourth 
as in 1889, etc."  Semenov concluded by noting that, "For an experienced statistician this data 
provides only the surety that in Russia there are no fewer than eighty, and no more than 120 
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million persons."
xxiii
  As the Interior Minister noted, the existing system had "deprived" the 
compilers of this data of "any control," a view with which Defense Minister Dmitrii Miliutin, 
himself an enthusiast for statistics, agreed.
 xxiv
 
When the abolition of the poll tax in 1886 removed the Finance Ministry’s continued 
need for a soslovie-based population count a series of commissions began work on a census 
project.  The State Council finally passed a census law on June 5, 1895.
xxv
 Just as the Great 
Reforms began to dismantle the particularism of imperial society, the census intended to provide 
a measure of the population based on a standard form.  Like the Great Reforms, policy makers 
argued that a modern census was necessary to enhance and maintain the dynastic state and the 
Empire’s position in the world.  A complete census would allow the state to maintain order, 
manage public welfare and project its power abroad.  In short, it provided a means of harnessing 
the Empire’s demographic resources for its own ends.  Ultimately this meant that census officials 
would have to maintain a precarious balance between their definition of citizenship and that of 
the population. 
 
Constructing an Imperial Identity 
 “Othering” was a process essential to maintaining the dynastic state; difference 
legitimated the emperor as an imperial adhesive.  However, as much as categorizing the 
population facilitated the “othering” process it also pointed toward a horizontality that 
challenged the vertical structure of state and society. Enumerating individuals by name according 
to their own indications (those of the head of household), not according to official documents 
(enumerators were not allowed to ask for them) undercut the official conception of imperial 
society as a hierarchy of social estates or soslovia (sing. soslovie).  The census counted the 
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“developed” segments of the population equally (i.e., using the same questions) and reduced the 
entire population (including the imperial family) to numbers devoid of rank and, ultimately, 
holes on a punch card manipulated by one of Herman Hollerith’s tabulators.xxvi  Nicholas II was 
the only person who could record his primary occupation as “Khoziain zemli Russkoi,” but, when 
aggregated, he became one of many Orthodox male heads of household who was a native 
speaker of Russian. Although the punch-card tabulator promised to infuse autocratic power with 
the electrical current of the modern age, Nicholas himself became nothing more than a manila 
card capable of inanimate manipulation and control. 
In addition, the census defined the empire not as the dynasty, the state, or its territory but 
as the population (naselenie).  This invention of the social was by far the most significant and 
long-lasting achievement of nineteenth-century statistics.
xxvii
  The official title for the census, 
“First General Census of the Population of the Russian (Rossiiskaia) Empire,” had inclusive, 
dynastic implications; census categories amounted to official recognition of the empire’s 
diversity, and it was thus perfectly normal that Nicholas II recorded German as Empress 
Alexandra’s native language on the imperial family’s census form.  At the same time, however, it 
elevated the population at large to center stage and highlighted the empire’s demographic 
strength—as opposed to its government or particularistic social structure—as its most important 
resource.  This was the focus of the report on preliminary census results delivered by the Main 
Census Commission (MCC) chair, Petr Petrovich Semenov (later Semenov-Tian-Shanskii).  The 
government’s newspaper, Pravitel’stvennyi vestnik, and local newspapers perpetuated this first 
statistical representation of the imagined imperial community in its entirety, focusing on key 
demographic data related to their province.
xxviii
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The same horizontality that challenged the vertically ordered dynastic state legitimated a 
state-sponsored conception of an imperial civil society (“citizenship” or horizontality) within it. 
Semenov delivered his statistical portrait of the empire to a general session of the Geographic 
Society.  This act can be interpreted as an attempt by the state to legitimate its imperial project 
before civil society—an attempt perpetuated by local newspapers and their focus on how their 
locale fit into and compared with the imperial whole.  Dal’nyi vostok, quoting from 
Pravitel’stvennyi vestnik, offered its readers a statistical comparison of the Far East and other 
parts of the empire, paying particular attention to the region’s disparity of female inhabitants 
(and thus mirroring official demographic concerns in the region).
xxix
  In addition, even though 
officials became increasingly uncomfortable with self-identification (and thwarted it in certain 
circumstances—see below), they generally trusted the population to self-identify and, in doing 
so, made them more “citizens” than subjects of the empire.xxx 
The census also implied citizenship in that, for the first time, it attempted to mobilize the 
entire population for a single project.  The MCC initially planned to conduct the census in 
imperial terms in the sense that it planned for all census work to be completed by local officials 
and representatives of leading sosloviia who were either required by the census law or expected 
by tradition to participate.  As the Statistical Council discussed the census project in March of 
1894, its members (including the chair, Semenov) included in the list of potential enumerators 
noble land owners (pomeshchiki), clerics of various types, rural teachers, tax inspectors, 
members of Peasant Affairs bureaus, and perhaps (if necessary) literate peasants.  Ideally, 
approximately 4,200 enumerators would count 25,000 people each.
xxxi
 
These projections, however, proved to be grossly out of touch with reality.  The expected 
number of volunteers from the ranks of local officials and notables fell far short of the original 
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estimate, and the MCC found itself deluged by frantic notes from provincial census commissions 
asking for money to hire additional enumerators.  For some reason it did not occur to the 
Statistical Council and the MCC that traveling through the Russian countryside in January (plus 
participating in the sub-totaling of results) might not be an attractive proposition.  The MCC 
responded by first making it clear that all persons deemed sufficiently literate (including women 
and sometimes Jews) could serve as enumerators. The MCC also pursued additional 
enumerators—especially volunteers—along a more traditional dynastic path.  At the end of 
October 1896 Interior Minister Goremykin wrote to Count I. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, the Minister 
of the Imperial Household, requesting that a medal for volunteers be struck in the Tsar’s name.  
The MCC planned to use the medal as a lure to recruit volunteer enumerators and as a reward to 
those volunteers who met a certain quota for a given area.
xxxii
  Assessing the conduct of the 
census in St. Petersburg, the head of the city census commission noted that the medal and the 
Emperor’s accompanying decree were instrumental in convincing a significant number of 
persons of the need to perform their “civic duty (grazhdanskii dolg).”xxxiii  The fact that copies of 
these medals circulated on the open market in at least one locale is perhaps testimony to the 
census’ creation of a sense of horizontal integration among at least some segments of the 
population not traditionally included in the traditional dichotomy of state and society.
xxxiv
  Nearly 
150,000 enumerators (many of them peasants) and other census officials eventually participated 
in the census, and the census project itself took on heroic proportions in numerous enumerator 
accounts.
xxxv
 
The process of creating a statistical portrait of the empire—like Repin’s “Religious 
Procession in Kazan’”—became empire-wide in a social, as well as territorial, sense.  The 
conduct of the census in Odessa illustrates this most lavishly.  On January 22 city governor and 
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census commission chair, N. A. Zelenoi, launched the census with a solemn mass in the great 
hall of the stock exchange.  According to the correspondent for Odesskii listok, all twenty-nine 
census parcel leaders and all 640 enumerators (several of whom sang with the choir) attended the 
mass.  Many wore their credentials (a pin), and all were treated to a patriotic blessing.  Besides 
this sacral send-off, census officials in Odessa took the unprecedented step of publishing the 
names and addresses of all census parcel leaders in local newspapers to ensure that inhabitants 
knew where to turn with their inquiries.  The census in Odessa thus became not only a sacred, 
patriotic duty, but a public act of society as a whole.
xxxvi
                                                                                                                
The government itself encouraged the image of the census as a social act.  As a MCC 
pamphlet prepared to explain census goals to the general public noted, the “undoubted increase” 
of the population and 
the gradual development of living and economic conditions and other phenomena of 
public life—both favorable and unfavorable—are leading people of science and persons 
standing at the head of state administrations to a recognition of the necessity of direct 
observation over the life of the people, such that by means of reasonable and expedient 
measures extended by life itself, they might facilitate the development of public 
welfare.
xxxvii
 
 
The state thus asked the population to participate in a process that legitimated the dynastic 
empire by representing its order in a “scientific” manner—by incorporating the population into 
an “objective” system of representation that could be used to ensure the efficacy of state actions 
vis-à-vis its subjects.  By extension, subjects in a sense became citizens responsible for the 
improvement of their own welfare.  This was a new imperial vision in that it charged the dynastic 
state and subjects alike (as opposed to enlightenment/reform from above) not only with the task 
of maintaining order but of creating progress. 
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The legitimating power of the census explains why census-takers became so concerned 
with the accuracy and incontestability of the census and insisted on measures to ensure that the 
census process remained free of fraud.  Oberprocurator of the Holy Synod K. P. Pobedonostsev 
was especially concerned that some persons would misrepresent their rank or social position.  He 
found this possibility disturbing because the census, as an official act, legitimated any recorded 
data.  In his words: 
[I]n many cases persons who illegally misappropriate for themselves...the rank of priest 
or (according to the Austrian hierarchy) bishop, and, in addition, presbyters and 
preceptors in unrecognized sects, can use the revision [census] as an official act to 
receive indirect recognition of a rank which is not recognized by law.  It might easily 
happen that persons [registrars]...(who are not rarely from the ranks of the young and 
inexperienced—students, middle-school pupils, teachers, etc.), owing to their 
inexperience…will make notations about these individuals according to these persons' 
indications, whereas the rank which ought solely to be recorded is their soslovie 
(meshchanin, peasant, etc.)….xxxviii 
 
Thus, the Oberprocurator feared that the power of the census to define social identity 
would be used to further the interests of Old Belief and "sects" to the detriment of the official 
church.  Manufactured consent—in this case, statistical representation of the demographic 
predominance of Orthodoxy—required diligence.  The MCC took his fears seriously, and passed 
a resolution imposing stiff fines for malicious misrepresentation.
xxxix
  Based on a fear of 
inaccuracies (intended or not) it also denied requests by local administrative bodies (state, city 
and zemstvo) to process or make use of any census data prior to its official publication.
xl
  In 
addition, officials deemed the publication of census figures based on questionable raw data as 
not only “undesirable” but “dangerous.”xli 
Concern with the legitimating power of the census persisted after the completion of data 
collection and well into the process of aggregation and publication.  As one member of a 
commission reviewing census processing noted in his post-census critique, any inaccurate figures 
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would "injure the authority of official figures and would provide reason to doubt them."  Because 
it would be difficult to "re-establish trust" in government figures once it had been abused, 
commission member N. Osipov argued that, in view of the poor quality of some of the data, the 
Central Statistical Committee (CSC) should refrain from presenting a detailed analysis of several 
aspects of the first census.
xlii
  Eliminating certain planned tables (e.g., tables pertaining to the 
distribution of the peasant population in terms of their pre-1861 status, tables on children less 
than one year of age, tables on persons having completed military service, and tables listing the 
place of permanent residence for persons absent on the day of the census) would ensure "more 
trust in the census," and hence, in the government.
xliii
  Finally, the CSC’s inability to complete 
census processing and publication in a timely, detailed and useable fashion (the last volumes 
appeared in 1906 and the individual publications for each province became increasingly 
simplified) became a source of embarrassment for the state because it undermined the very 
legitimacy that officials intended the census to create.
xliv
  The policy of banning zemstvo and city 
statistical work prior to the census, combined with the tardy publication of census results, erased 
much of these organizations’ original enthusiasm for the census project.  Within five years of 
administering the census the government had to concede requests from both the St. Petersburg 
and Moscow city dumas to conduct censuses (in 1900 and 1902 respectively).  At the same time, 
zemstvos and other cities deluged the CSC with petitions for access to census data.
xlv
 
The census, then, provided an opportunity for the imperial state to create a civil society 
compatible with its imperial project of ordering its domains (“seeing like a state”xlvi) and 
maintaining its great power status.  At the same time, however, the all-inclusive nature of the 
census process—which subjected even the imperial family to enumeration and categorization—
itself undermined the empire’s vertical structure.  The state’s inability to fulfill the civic promise 
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of the census—access to data vital to improving general welfare—further damaged the 
credibility of the Empire’s vertically ordered society.   Furthermore the categorization of the 
population, although it provided an opportunity for officials to construct the empire according to 
their own vision, also created an arena for imperial citizens to contest their official place in the 
imperial order. 
 
Categories and Conceptions of Imperial Order 
Sources—mainly the journals of the MCC—reveal little of the actual debate behind the 
selection of census categories.  Given the dedication of Semenov and other officials to the 
International Statistical Congress’ project (Russia hosted the event in 1872), it is possible that the 
Congress’ categories elicited little discussion.xlvii  The information to be collected, as stipulated 
in Article 2 of the census statute, demonstrated a direct relation between the census project and 
the Statistical Congress’ general principles.  Registrars would ask each person for their name, 
relationship to head of household, age, religion, native language, place of birth, occupation, 
literacy, and physical disabilities.  The census would also follow the Congress' recommendations 
on registering persons in terms of their permanent or temporary residence and collecting data by 
household.  The census project authors also deviated from international proposals by ignoring the 
Congress’ recommendation to collect information on dwelling size and attached gardens, and 
adding a question on gender.  In addition, the MCC divided the question on literacy into the 
questions "Can you read?" and "Where did you study?"  It also added a question on military 
service (under pressure from the War Ministry) and divided the question on occupation into a 
request that respondents state their primary and secondary occupations.  The final project aimed 
at dividing the Empire's population according to eighteen different characteristics.
xlviii
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The nature of other categories added by the MCC—questions or “rubrics” on the census 
forms—reveals much about the state’s conception of the empire and how the census process 
would legitimate this image.  For all of the horizontality implied in the census process itself, 
census categories aimed to concretize a hierarchical social structure in numbers.  Questions on 
soslovie, sostoianie, or zvanie; place of registration (pripiska—for those required to be 
registered); and place of permanent/temporary residence represented a population that was 
predominantly rural where everyone could account for his or her social and geographic place in 
the vertical structure of the empire.  More than any other type of information, the collection of 
such data distinguished the Russian from other European censuses.  As St. Petersburg University 
Statistics Professor I. I. Kaufman noted in his summary of census difficulties, even though social 
estate was no longer a "topic of statistics” in Western Europe it was still an important category in 
Russia.  "Social estate still has a great significance in Russia," he noted, "because, on the one 
hand, the nobility has maintained and desires to maintain its state importance; it continues to live 
and desires to live by its full estate life.  On the other hand, the peasantry, too, continues to live 
as a social estate, the maintenance of which…it considers the basic condition for the protection 
of its vitality….xlix The collection of these data thus represented an attempt to manufacture 
consent for the decaying (as the census process itself revealed) soslovie system and solidify this 
conception of the Empire’s evolving social order via the census.l  Indeed, the collection and 
tabulation of data on soslovie marked a pointed attempt to vertically order the Empire. 
The most graphic explication of this appears in the projected tables for the first two 
publications of census material.  These publications consisted of the sixteen tables listed in Table 
1.
li
  Note the census categories being compared and numerically fixed in this tabulation process: 
age, social estate, native language, and religion. The breakdown and comparison of the 
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population by social estate was a somewhat frivolous endeavor when peasants comprised such an 
overwhelming majority of the population.  This choice of comparisons seemed no less puzzling 
to contemporaries such as A. Kotel’nikov, whose critique of the census asked, "Why…has there 
not yet been given a compilation of the most important descriptors of the population, for example 
by occupation, family position, or a combination of occupation with place of origin?"  Why did 
the CSC "with great pains" wish to publish such information as the "distribution of children less 
than one year old" by social estate, native language and religion?
lii
 
Table 1 
Composition of Tables in First Two Census Publications 
1. General tabulation of population by locale 9. Distribution of population by native language 
2. Distribution of population by household 10. Distribution of pop. by native lang. & soslovie 
3. Dist. of pop. by sex & age (10-yr. age gps.). 11. Dist. of pop. by native lang. & age (10-yr. age gps.) 
4. Distribution of population by sex, age & literacy 
 
12. Dist. of children < 1 yr. by parental native lang. & 
age in mos. 
5. Distribution of children < 1 year old by age in mos. 13. Distribution of population by religion. 
6. Distribution of population by soslovie 14. Dist. of pop. by religion & age (10-yr. age gps.) 
7. Dist. of pop. by soslovie & age (10-yr age gps.) 15. Dist. of children < 1 yr. by religion & age in mos. 
8. Dist. of children < 1 yr. old by soslovie & age in mos. 16. Dist. of pop. by place of birth and soslovie 
 
 The answer was that, for a government whose political authority rested on Orthodoxy and 
the cooperation of the noble estate—both those born to it and those who earned it through 
government service—the comparison of these data by social estate can be interpreted as an 
attempt to discern its fate in the census.  The combination of social estate and age provided clues 
to the demographic vitality of the ruling class.  Similar comparisons for religion and native 
language indicated the demographic vitality of Orthodoxy and the Great Russian people.  The 
distribution of children less than one year old by all three of these categories provided an 
indication of where the reproduction of rulers, Russians and Orthodox stood in comparison to the 
ruled, non-Russians, and the non-Orthodox.  Even after census processing fell behind schedule 
and over budget most of these original combinations remained or were expanded (for example, 
literacy received a more prominent place). In fact, the CSC only rejected the tables on children 
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less than one-year old because they relied on questionable data.  From this perspective the 
collection and tabulation of census data on soslovie emerges as an attempt to concretize an 
existing (though recent and developing) category for purposes of control.
liii
 
 The question, "place of registration" was also unique to Russia's census and also 
represents an attempt to use the census to order the Empire.  In theory, the question simply 
required that respondents indicate the village, community, township, district and province in 
which they paid taxes. The purpose of the question was, in part, to be able to trace the migration 
of the empire's labor supply.  Although acknowledging the new reality of a mobile labor force, 
however, the question’s very nature aimed more at a Russia where, in spite of labor mobility, 
every person "knew their place”—even if they did not happen to be living there on the day of the 
census.  Four different census forms (A, B, V, and A/B) reinforced this idea.  The census counted 
persons on one of these forms based on the distinction between rural and urban areas, land 
tenure, and local circumstances.
liv
  The compilers of the census did not anticipate that subjects 
would not know and willingly divulge their place of legal registration.  For persons not residing 
in their place of registration, this information should have been readily accessible from internal 
passports (which they could consult, but enumerators could not).  Census-takers, however, 
discovered that although a majority of the population (probably those still residing in or near 
their place of birth) could state the province, district and volost' to which they were registered, 
many had problems providing answers as one moved down the scale of territorial units. 
Attempts to pin down the rural population via the census (the statute required that a third 
copy of the results be used to update volost’ records) were among the least successful—most 
likely because some peasants attempted to use the census to escape the bounds of their 
communes (although the official explanation attributed problems to the fact that many villages 
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had changed membership between neighboring communes on more than one occasion) or 
legitimate illegal family divisions.
lv
  Indeed, one suspects that the census was seen and used by 
many as an opportunity to liberate themselves from their official place in society—to be citizens 
of the imagined space created by the census (part of a broader civil society) rather than subjects.  
This was especially true for the Empire’s official outcasts, exiles and their progeny, who not only 
sought to change their status in the census process, but also served as enumerators.
lvi
 
Questions on age, place of birth, occupation and military service not only represented the 
human resources at the state’s disposal and their movement over time, but also underlined this 
vertical structure (even as the census placed the population itself at center stage).  In particular, 
the process of collecting data on primary and secondary occupations indicated a conception of 
the peasantry little changed from previous centuries.  The question of primary and secondary 
occupations created much confusion, in part because it was an alien concept to peasant 
respondents. Part of the problem resulted directly from the time of the census; in January, many 
peasants working in factories probably answered that they were workers, even though their 
primary occupation was on the farm.  Another difficulty arose from the fact that many peasants 
did not specialize, which meant that there was a great possibility that the secondary occupation 
identified in January 1897 was not the same a year (or less) later.  Indeed, just as some peasants 
went to the factories in the winter, rural off-farm labor also varied with the seasons.
lvii
 
There are indications that, when enumerators explained “primary occupation” as “main 
means of subsistence,” peasants generally understood and provided accurate information.  
However, when these actual responses differed from those expected by census officials (i.e., 
when peasants listed their primary occupation as otkhod, carting, etc.), officials changed entries 
to “farming” based on the soslovie of the respondent.  In such cases the “proper” primary 
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economic place for peasants lay in agriculture.  At the same time, when urban respondents 
classified their primary occupation as farming and secondary occupation as factory or some other 
urban work, census processors sometimes switched the two.  When inhabitants in the towns of 
the Akmolinsk region attempted to more accurately describe their status as “urban peasants 
(gorodskie krest’iane)” enumerators resorted to physical appearance to determine their soslovie.  
Such incidents often resulted in what Kotel'nikov termed "the proletarianization of the rural 
population."  In addition to this, "unemployed" was not included among the acceptable 
responses.  The rules thus obliged registrars to paint a picture of full employment by recording 
some sort of occupation for each person.
lviii
  In all of these cases, “ordering” the empire via the 
census provided a means to create the “well-ordered” state to which officials long aspired. 
At the same time that questions related to soslovie and occupation elicited a portrait of 
the empire’s social order, questions on religion, native language, knowledge of Russian, literacy, 
and source of education aimed at a statistical portrait of the imperial order in a more traditional 
colonial sense.  Data collected under these headings promised officials a measure of the 
population’s level of development within the empire, indicating both the civilizing empire’s 
achievements and areas in need of attention.  From another perspective, such data would allow 
the state to gauge the demographic strength of the metropolitan people (i.e., Russians)—to assess 
the vitality of the state religion, the state language, and the main carriers of these civilizing 
influences.  That there was no specific question on nationality should come as no surprise and 
cannot necessarily be attributed to imperial motives.  Given the MCC’s reliance on international 
standards (much influenced by representatives from ethnically homogeneous states), the absence 
of nationality as a specific category could be innocuous.  Unfortunately, other than post-census 
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explanations of the intent to divine nationality by cross-referencing data on religion and native 
language, archival records again reveal little of the decision-making process.
lix
 
Yet, excluding nationality as a census category ultimately served state interests, as doing 
so placed more power over who belonged to what nationality in census officials’ hands. On the 
one hand, the dynastic state made gallant efforts to ensure that headings of census forms were 
translated into the local languages of as many subjects as possible, fostering inclusion on 
particularistic terms within the imperial polity—a sense of belonging to a single entity.  One of 
the MCC’s first acts consisted of a circular to provincial governors asking that they submit 
detailed lists of the languages that census forms should appear in and the quantity of each 
translation required.
lx
  On the other hand, census forms reinforced a more typical sort of 
particularism.  The census statute excluded several regions of the North, Central Asia, the 
Caucasus and Siberia from the general count, deeming them too ”uncivilized” to fall under the 
general rules.
lxi
  Such areas were so “underdeveloped” that they could not be “ordered” in a 
civilized fashion.  They were to be counted on form A/B; in especially “backward” areas the 
MCC instructed local census commissions to eliminate several questions on the form (e.g., 
religion for various steppe nomads). 
Form A/B, however, also came to objectify all peripheral areas’ subordination to the 
center.  It became the norm not only in undeveloped areas, but in many developed parts of the 
empire as well—particularly the Polish provinces.  Here, the existence of the all-estate gmina—
the lack of soslovie-based particularism—rendered the distinction between forms A and B 
unnecessary.  In this way, the census united the most “civilized” western and “least civilized” 
eastern parts of the empire, contributing to what one recent study has described as a broadening 
conception of the term inorodtsy.
lxii
  Poles and Germans found themselves being counted on the 
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same form (albeit with a full compliment of categories) as Kazakhs (“Kirgiz”), and Turkmen.  
Ironically, the assistance of “undeveloped” enumerators from the indigenous population 
ultimately determined the success of the census in these areas. 
The absence of a specific census category for nationality became especially important for 
the process of statistically ordering the Empire in the Western Provinces, where the category 
nationality and its association with demographic power mattered most.  The sensitive nature of 
the Polish provinces entered MCC discussions early as a request from the Warsaw Governor 
General that enumerators in the region be predominantly Russian and that commanders of the 
region’s fortresses be allowed to conduct the census in such a way that vital defense information 
not leave fortress walls in the guise of enumerators with suspect loyalties.
lxiii
  The region 
(especially parts of Sedlets and Liublin provinces—the future Kholm province) was also a key 
demographic battleground.
lxiv
  Russian claims on much of the area rested on a demographic 
foundation, namely the existence of “Little Russians”—Ukrainian peasants whose demographic 
weight comprised an important component not only of Russia’s regional presence but of the 
proportion of Russians in their own empire.  Without Ukrainians, Russians became a ruling 
minority rather than a majority.
lxv
 
It was also a region where the relationship between religion, native language and 
nationality was problematic.  Given the policy of self-identification, the Uniate population of 
Sedlets and Liublin provinces threatened the ability of the census to represent Russian 
demographic power in the area.  These persons became subjects of the Empire as a result of the 
partitions of Poland.  Tsarist officials spent much of the nineteenth century attempting to 
reincorporate these “lost” Russians spiritually, as well as territorially.  By 1875 the Uniate 
Church was officially non-existent and its members, now technically reunited with Orthodoxy, 
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fully “Russian” again.  Yet, evidence indicated to local officials that this was not the case.  At the 
beginning of July 1896 the Warsaw Governor-General submitted a note to the MCC pertaining to 
the enumeration of the former Uniate population.  The note suggested that religious data in 
several areas be registered not according to their own responses but according to information 
held by the local administration.  The Warsaw Statistical Committee agreed, noting that, as many 
former Uniates did not recognize themselves as Orthodox, they would “undoubtedly identify 
themselves to enumerators as [Roman] Catholics.” The MCC expressed little sympathy for his 
plan, but invited the Governor General to St. Petersburg to discuss the matter.
lxvi
  By August 
Pobedonostsev was familiar with the request from Warsaw; he wrote to inform the MCC that he 
would be sending a representative to meet with the MCC and the Governor General in order to 
ensure that “Catholic priests and Polish agitators” were not allowed to convince the local 
population to register as Roman Catholics.
lxvii
 
The existence of a large Uniate population in Austrian Galicia made defining the 
population in this region even more crucial.
lxviii
  Rumors that the census was a first step toward 
religious freedom—a benevolent gift agreed upon by Emperors Franz Joseph II and Nicholas 
II—permeated the region and increased tensions between census officials and the population.lxix  
Pressured by the Warsaw Governor General and Pobedonostsev, the MCC instructed 
enumerators to record respondents according to their own indications, but to have the entries on 
religion corrected by local officials as needed.
lxx
  However as enumerators entered the villages of 
these “former Uniates” (a term that the MCC used itself), they soon encountered difficulties—in 
many cases because enumerators failed to heed these instructions.  The archives include 
numerous petitions from individual Uniate families and—in most cases—from entire villages.  
Appealing to the Interior Minister, the Minister of the Imperial Household and the Tsar’—the 
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“Father of the People”—petitioners explained how enumerators and local officials ignored their 
wishes to register as Roman Catholics (in direct violation of the rules printed on the census 
form).  In some cases, petitioners noted, enumerators used their self-identification with an 
officially non-existent religion as a justification for recording marriages and births as 
illegitimate.
lxxi
  To emphasize that their complaint was not based on any fickleness of faith 
connected to the census, many villages emphasized the fact that they had been practicing Roman 
Catholics for nearly thirty years (i.e., since the final official abolition of the Uniate Church).  
Indeed, there is evidence that local gmina officials sometimes “corrected” some families’ official 
registration from Orthodox to Catholic.
lxxii
  Ultimately nearly 300 pages of petitions, and several 
arrests could not overcome the state’s desire to win the demographic battle between Orthodox 
Russians and Catholic Poles in the region (made even worse by the fact that many of these 
“Russian” petitions were in Polish).lxxiii  Although the heading “Uniate” appeared in the initial 
drafts of proposed tables on the population’s religious composition it soon disappeared.lxxiv  In 
this case, the “ordering” of the dynastic empire inherent in the census process did not allow the 
“Father of the People” to preserve his role as the empire’s glue.  This sensitive geo-strategic area 
required an adhesive more Russian (national) in composition. 
 A similar “ordering” on religious grounds that had implications for demographic power 
also occurred in relation to Old Believers and members of various religious sects.  In this 
instance, the “russifying” tendencies of those on the ground were themselves often at odds with 
the dynastic conception of the empire—undermining the unified particularisms of the dynastic 
state with a russifying agenda.  Religion was an important category in Russia.  Although the state 
deemed it crucial as an ethnic marker in the Western Provinces, official policy generally leaned 
in the direction of pragmatic toleration.  Both census-takers and census-subjects alike saw the 
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census as an opportunity to define the religious state of the Empire.  The official Orthodox 
Church, Old Believers and sect members sought to enhance or maintain their own numerical 
significance.  For Old Believers, the stakes were high: census figures could portray them either 
as a numerically significant and vibrant group or as simply a collection of fringe elements.  
Official accounts of the census emphasized the fringe element image by highlighting irrational 
sectarian reactions to the census.  The account of the official assigned as the census coordinator 
for the upper-Volga provinces devoted twelve pages to this subject, most of which portray the 
Old Believers and sect members as absurdly superstitious.  Thus we learn that many had the 
effrontery to attempt to register as "Orthodox" (which, in their own minds, they were).  Others 
viewed the census as apocalyptic, the third and "final" census.  Others simply refused to be 
counted by the anti-Christ.
lxxv
  In effect, the account emphasized the established connection 
between religious and civic deviancy. 
In addition, some registrars (often Orthodox priests) openly under-counted Old Believer 
and non-Orthodox villages or refused to recognize the legitimacy of their marriages and children.  
Three months after the census, the MCC received a letter of complaint on behalf of Old 
Believers in four census districts claiming that they were counted improperly.  Because of the 
local Orthodox priest’s influence on the process, the letter stated, "husbands and wives were 
registered as unmarried and their children were registered as illegitimate."  In this manner, the 
out-riders of Orthodoxy used the census to legitimate their own non-recognition of the validity of 
schismatic rites.
lxxvi
  For these reasons, those outside the official church, especially Old 
Believers, questioned their numerical representation, especially after publication of the two 
census volumes on religion in 1901: The Distribution of the Population of the Empire by Main 
Religions and The Distribution of Old Believers and Members of Sects by Persuasion and Sect.  
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The numbers in these volumes gave rise to a heated debate in the press.  According to these 
census figures, Old Believers, members of various sects and "deviations" comprised 2,173,738 
persons out of the empire's population of 127 million—less than two percent of the population.  
However, according to other data, these religious non-conformists numbered fourteen to fifteen 
million, a much more significant eleven-twelve percent of the population.
lxxvii
 
 One commentator argued that the census had significantly undercounted Old Believers 
and sect members.  He noted that the Tenth Revision in 1858 had defined the number of 
Schismatics as 805,000, and that several studies from this period indicated that more than seven 
million additional members were not counted, refused to admit that they were not Orthodox, or 
practiced the Old Belief secretly.  The author thus questioned the census count of just over two 
million, when the Schismatics had numbered eight million forty years earlier.
lxxviii
  We have no 
evidence that these late 1850s figures were any more accurate than the census.  However, we 
also have no evidence that the government sought to make a more accurate count of these 
persons in its plans for the second census and must also conclude that, at least on the local level, 
there was a concerted effort to undercount Old Believers and sect members.
lxxix
  In this way, the 
census diminished the importance of the dissenters, and enhanced that of the official church (or 
implied some sort of “reunion” with Orthodoxy).  At the same time it undermined state attempts 
to manage the horizontality created by the census process in a way that would maintain existing 
power relations. 
 The fact that officials also intended to extrapolate nationality from data on native 
language increased the possibility for honest error and, as with the case of religion, manipulation 
by local enumerators.
lxxx
  In official explanations, a separate question on nationality was not only 
impossible (because of the large number of nationalities within the empire), but also 
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unnecessary.  Answering post-census criticism of the lack of a specific question on nationality, 
an official of the CSC responded that, “In locales…where the population has a mixed character 
(and such places in the empire are not few) [the population’s] answers to the given question by 
far would not always correspond with reality.”  Furthermore, he averred, language, as opposed to 
nationality, was an indicator that was “completely objective and real.”  Perhaps more 
significantly, in a multiethnic empire knowing the population of individual “tribes” was 
“necessary neither for economic nor state needs.”  Information on native language was ultimately 
more useful.  Combined with data on knowledge of Russian, it also provided a method by which 
officials could define “the degree of russification [obruseniia] of inorodtsy.”lxxxi 
The MCC acknowledged that in certain instances native language could be problematic 
as a determinant of nationality.  One problem consisted of the fact that respondents were likely to 
give the language they used most often as their native tongue, and that this might have no 
bearing on their nationality.  For example, Estonians might respond that their native language 
was German, Lithuanians might claim Polish as their native tongue, and Jews might claim 
Russian.  In the case of the later, a cross reference with religion could settle the issue, but in the 
case of the Estonians and Lithuanians, "Lutheran" and "Catholic" could not serve to distinguish 
them from Germans or Poles.  A similar problem existed for some steppe peoples who identified 
their native tongue as Tatar.  In these cases, the registrar was to attempt to record the subject's 
true native tongue based on other indicators, such as the subject's surname, the name of the 
village, or his response to questions on local dialects (for which the MCC compiled a helpful 
chart).
lxxxii
  Thus, in spite of the supposed objectivity of native language as an indicator, the very 
manner of determining nationality allowed much room for error and abuse. 
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 Some abuse took place.  This was particularly true in the Empire's western provinces, 
where some non-Russians were beginning to resent increasing demands to conform to Great 
Russian standards in language and culture.  The Governor-General of Kiev, Podolsk and 
Volhynia provinces attempted to use the census as a means to increase this pressure by refusing 
to acknowledge the need to translate the census form into German, Czech, Polish, and other local 
languages, claiming that the population knew Russian "well enough."
lxxxiii
  Encumbering the 
population with the task of answering questions in Russian opened the door for abuse by 
registrars.  A census-day report to the MCC noted that the chair of one Polish census district had 
instructed the registrars in his jurisdiction to mark Russian as a person's native language if they 
answered the question "Do you speak Russian?" in the affirmative.
lxxxiv
  At the very least, this 
was a conscious attempt to show the increased use of Russian by non-Russians.  In a more 
serious sense, the district chair was attempting to show a decrease in the area's Polish population.  
Similar cases probably went unreported, a fact census officials acknowledged themselves.
lxxxv
  
As with religion, even when officials in St. Petersburg took steps to ensure an imperial “big tent” 
policy, local officials with a more zealous russifying agenda (as well as the tense and competitive 
nature of the western borderlands) often thwarted their efforts. 
 
Conclusion 
This brief look at one facet of the first imperial census illustrates a fundamental dilemma 
of empire in the late nineteenth century.  On one hand, the census provided an opportunity for 
the state to legitimate traditional social structures such as soslovie.  Census categories reaffirmed 
the vertical ordering of the dynastic empire; the forms and questions were designed to count a 
population in which everyone knew their places—family, social, geographic, economic and 
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political—a society ordered in a vertical fashion with Nicholas II at the top.  At the same time, 
the census process itself created a sense of horizontality—a sense of imperial citizenship.  The 
“universal” nature of the census—its “empire-wide” character—created the impression of a 
horizontally integrated polity by making it possible to imagine the empire (and its population) as 
a single unit rather than the sum of its parts.  Guidelines on self-identification, the mobilization 
of society as enumerators, census coverage in the press, the translation of census forms, the 
rhetoric of “scientific” administration and national rejuvenation contributed to the process of 
creating a horizontal legitimacy for the dynastic state. 
This attempt to “stretch the skin of nation over empire” was, however, an ambiguous (and 
politically sensitive) process.  Like a balloon, “the skin of nation” became weaker as officials 
expanded it to fit the empire.  The same aspects of the census that made it possible to imagine the 
empire as community—a state-sponsored and categorized civil society—also undermined the 
legitimacy of the imperial project.  Translating census forms into the empire’s languages in the 
name of legitimating its dynastic nature affirmed (or perhaps created) the aspirations of language 
groups themselves.  Enumerating inhabitants by name undercut the idea of imperial society as a 
collection of hierarchically organized sosloviia.  The universal nature of the census—the 
enumeration of the bulk of the population with the same instrument—also contradicted a legal 
structure based on privileged estates.  At the same time, the census provided the state with a 
means to solidify the developing soslovie system and assess the demographic strength of the 
metropolitan people and its elite. 
The process of ordering the empire became more overtly political in the process of 
enumerating the population by native language and religion.  A conflict emerged between self-
identification and where the state (either in the guise of the MCC or local census officials) 
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thought people belonged.  Indeed, mobilizing society meant in many cases mobilizing persons 
with agendas more (Russian) national than imperial.  The cases of the Uniates and Old Believers 
show not only the increasing importance of Orthodoxy as an indicator of “Russianness,” but also 
how other concerns and the agendas of servitors and subjects outside the metropole undercut the 
ability of the census to create a sense of horizontal integration within the dynastic state.  A 
continued examination of the census experience from the perspective of the counted will 
ultimately reveal both the extent to which this was the case and the meaning they attached to the 
census (i.e., the extent to which imperial categories and the imperial project worked or failed).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
 
 
 
 
                          
i
 Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through 
Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 224; Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 
1991). 
ii
  Anderson, Imagined Communities, esp. chpt. 10; idem, The Spectre of Comparisons: 
Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World (London: Verso, 1998), esp. 34-40. 
iii
  William Alonso & Paul Starr, eds., The Politics of Numbers (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1987); Ian Hacking,  “Making Up People,” in Thomas C. Heller, et al, eds., 
Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy Individuality and the Self in Western Thought 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986); Francine Hirsch,  “The Soviet Union as a Work in 
Progress: Ethnographers and the Category Nationality in the 1926, 1937, and 1939 Censuses;”  
Slavic Review 56, no. 2 (1997): 251-78; Carl Ipsen, Dictating Demography: The Problem of 
Population in Fascist Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Silvana Patriarca, 
Numbers and Nationhood: Writing Statistics in Nineteenth-Century Italy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995); Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of 
Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) Kenneth W. 
Jones, “Religious Identity and the Indian Census,” in N. Gerald Barrier, ed., The Census in 
British India New Perspectives (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1981); Nicholas B. Dirks, 
Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India (Princeton: Princeton University 
 33 
                                                                                 
Press, 2001), esp. chpt. 10; Indian Census Centenary Seminar: Proceedings (New Delhi: Office 
of the Registrar General, India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1974); Dandupani Natarjan, Indian 
Census through a Hundred Years, 2 vols. (New Delhi: Office of the Registrar General, India, 
Ministry of Home Affairs, 1972-1973); Shyam Chandra Srivastava, Indian Census in 
Perspective (New Delhi: Office of the Registrar General, India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 
1983). 
iv
  V. M. Kabuzan, “O dostovernosti ucheta naseleniia Rossii (1858-1917 gg.),”  
Istochnikovedenie otechestvennoi istorii (1982): 100-17; K. B. Litvak, “Perepis’ naseleniia 1897 
goda o krest’ianstve Rossii (Istochnikovedcheskii aspekt),” Istoriia SSSR, no. 1 (1990): 114-26.  
The standard work on the Russian and Soviet censuses is Ralph S. Clem, ed., Research Guide to 
the Russian and Soviet Censuses (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1986).  Within this 
volume, Lee Schwartz provides a brief history of the 1897 census, as well as subsequent Soviet 
censuses.  See also: Hans-Jakob Tebarth, "Zur Geschichte der Ersten Allegemeinen 
Volkszählung des Russischen Reiches vom 28, Januar 1897," Jahrbücher für Geschichte 
Osteuropas 38 (1990) H. 1, 73-86;  V. Plandovskii, Narodnaia perepis’ (St. Petersburg, 1898); 
A. Kotel'nikov, Istoriia proizvodstva i razrabotki vseobshchei perepisi naseleniia 28-go ianvaria 
1897 g. (St Petersburg, 1909—largely a scathing critique of census deficiencies); A. I. Gozulov, 
Perepisi naseleniia SSSR i kapitalisticheskikh stran: Opyt istoriko-metodologicheskoi 
kharakteristiki proizvodstva perepisei naseleniia (Moscow, 1936). 
v
  Keneth W. Jones, "Religious Identity and the Indian Census," 73. 
vi
  E. V. Anisimov, Podatnaia reforma Petra I: Vvedenie podushnoi podati v Rossii, 
1719-1728 gg. (Leningrad: Nauka, 1982); Henning Bauer, Andreas Kappeler & Brigitte Roth, 
eds., Die Nationalitäten des russischen Reiches in der Volkzählung von 1897 (Stuttgart:: F. 
 34 
                                                                                 
Steiner, 1991); Christoph Schmidt, Ständrecht und Standeswechsel in Russland 1851-1917 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1994). 
vii
 Yuri Slezkine, “Naturalists versus Nations: Eighteenth-Century Russian Scholars 
Confront Ethnic Diversity,” in Daniel R. Brower & Edward J. Lazzerini, eds., Russia’s Orient: 
Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 
27-57; Mark Bassin, Imperial Visions: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in 
the Russian Far East, 1840-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Willard 
Sunderland, “Russians into Iakuts? ‘Going Native’ and Problems of Russian National Identity in 
the Siberian North, 1870s-1914,” Slavic Review 55, no. 4 (1996): 806-825; Robert P. Geraci, 
Window on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2001). 
viii
   Anderdson, Imagined Communities, esp. chpt. 3. 
ix
  For the original arguments see Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit 
(Neuwied, 1962); Miroslav Hroch, “From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The 
Nation-Building Process in Europe,” New Left Review 198 (March-April 1993): 3-20. 
x
  Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London 1971), 54; Geoff 
Eley, “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century,” in 
Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 289-
339; David Bell, “The Public Spheres, the State, and the World of Law in Eighteenth-Century 
France,” French Historical Studies 17 (Fall 1992): 912-34. 
xi
  Dov Yaroshevski, “Empire and Citizenship” and Austin Lee Jersild, “From Savagery 
to Citizenship: Caucasian Mountaineers and Muslims in the Russian Empire,” both in Brower & 
Lazzerini, eds., Russia’s Orient, 58-79, 101-14. 
 35 
                                                                                 
xii
 A. G. Troinitskii, The Serf Population of Russia According to the 10
th
 National Census, 
Ed. Evsey Domar, Trans. Elaine Herman (Newtonville, MA: Oriental Research Partners, 1982). 
xiii
 Ocherk razvitiia voprosa o vseobshchei narodnoi perepisi v Rossii.  Ministerstvo 
vnutrennikh del.  Tsentral'nyi Statisticheskii Komitet.  20 fevralia 1890 g. (St. Petersburg, 1890), 
3-4 (hereafter Ocherk razvitiia voprosa o vseobshchei narodnoi perepisi).  Also published in 
Vremennik Tsentral'nago Statisticheskago Komiteta, No. 16 (1890); Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi 
Istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGIA) f. 1290 (Tsentral’nyi Statisticheskii Komitet pri Ministerstve 
Vnutrennikh Del), op. 10, d. 5, l. 1 (quote). 
xiv
 W. Bruce Lincoln, Petr Petrovich Semenov-Tian-Shanskii: The Life of a Russian 
Geographer (Newtonville, MA: Oriental Research Partners, 1980); Idem, In the Vanguard of 
Reform: Russia’s Enlightened Bureaucrats, 1825-1861 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 1982); Dvadsatipiatiletie Imperatorskago Russkago Geograficheskago Obshchestva 13 
ianvaria 1871 g. (St. Petersburg, 1872); A Bushen, Ob ustroistve istochnikov statistiki naseleniia 
v Rossii (St. Petersburg, 1864); RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 5, l36.  Interior Minister Goremykin 
officially held the title of chair of the Main Census Commission, but as vice chair Semenov was 
responsible for the actual oversight of the census.  Those reviewing the census project ultimately 
decided that its status was more akin to the other great reforms than to the emancipation and 
discarded the manifesto idea. 
xv
 RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 5, ll. 117-119ob. 
xvi
 Ibid., d. 4, ll. 61-2. 
xvii
 Ibid., l. 154ob. 
xviii
 Ibid., ll. 85, 86, 88-89, 154ob. 
xix
 Ibid., d. 5, l. 8; Ocherk razvitiia voprosa o vseobshchei narodnoi perepisi, 71. 
 36 
                                                                                 
xx
 Ibid., d. 4, l. 115 (quote), 117. 
xxi
 Ibid, ll. 64-65.  See also ll. 16-17. 
xxii
 Ibid., ll. 65-66. 
xxiii
 Ibid., ll. 70-71. 
xxiv
  Ocherk razvitiia voprosa o vseobshchei narodnoi perepisi, 70-7. 
xxv
  Kotel'nikov, Istoriia proizvodstva i razrabotki vseobshchei perepisi, 18; Polnoe 
Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (PSZRI), IIIrd Series, No. 11803 (St. Petersburg, 1899). 
xxvi
  After reviewing their performance in the 1890 US and Austro-Hungarian censuses, 
the Russian government opted to use Hollerith’s machines in 1897 (one still sits in the 
Polytechnical Museum in Moscow).  See V. Struve, "O primenenii elektrichestva k podschetu 
statisticheskikh dannykh (Herman Hollerith—Electric Tabulating System)," Vremennik 
Tsentral'nago Statisticheskago Komiteta 37 (1894); Geoffrey Austrian, Herman Hollerith: 
Forgotten Giant of Information Processing (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); 
Frederick G. Bohme, One Hundred Years of Data Processing: The Punchcard Century 
(Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Data User Services 
Division, 1991).  For a discussion of the power gained by reducing populations to punch cards 
see Edwin Black, IBM and the Holocaust: The Strategic Alliance Between Nazi Germany and 
America’s Most Powerful Corporation (New York: Crown Publishers, 2001). 
xxvii
 My thanks to Peter Holquist for this phrasing. 
xxviii
  P. P. Semenov, “Kharakternye vyvody iz pervoi vseobshchei perepisi. Soobshchenie 
Vitse-predsedatelia I. R. G. O. P. P. Semenova v obshchem sobranii I. R. G. O.—7-go maia 1897 
goda,” Izvestiia Imperatorskago Geograficheskago Obshchestva XXXIII, Vypusk I (1897): 249-
70; Pravitel’stvennyi vestnik, No. 123 (07.V.97): 2; “Iz itogov perepisi naseleniia,” Narod, No. 
 37 
                                                                                 
141 (09.V.97): 1-2; “Nekotoryia dannyia perepisi,” Kazanskii telegraf, No. 1306 (11.V.97): 1; 
“Neskol’ko slov o rezul’tatov vseobshchei perepisi,” Kaspii, No. 105 (18.V.97): 2; 
Nizhegorodskii listok, No. 128 (12..V.97): 2; “Ob”edinenie statistiki,” Astrakhanskii vestnik, No. 
2462 (29.VI.97): 2; “Dannyia vseobshchei perepisi,” Dal’nyi vostok, No 89 (10.VIII.97): 3-4. 
xxix
 “Dannyia vseobshchei perepisi,” Dal’nyi vostok No. 89 (10 August 1897): 3-4; David 
Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the 
Path to War with Japan (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001), 90-101, 206-07. 
xxx
  Tsentral’nyi Statisticheskii Komitet (TsSK), Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis’ 
naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii, 1897 goda.  I.  Arkhangel’skaia guberniia (St. Petersburg, 1899), 
Tetrad’ II, 48-9 (fn). 
xxxi
  RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 5, ll. 88-89, 107-107ob. 
xxxii
  Ibid., d. 51; d. 68, ll. 28, 72-3.  To view the medal see Glavnaia Perepisnaia 
Kommissiia, Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis’ naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii na osnovanii 
Vysochaishe utverzhdennago 5 iiunia 1895 goda.  Vypusk I.  Chast’ Obshchaia.  Instruktsii, 
nastavleniia, perepisnye listy, perechnevyia vedomosti, oblozhki, vedomosti dlia podscheta, i 
primery zapolneniia listov (St. Petersburg, 1896).  Or, visit Moscow’s Museum of the Political 
History of Russia (nee Museum of the Revolution) on Tverskaia ulitsa. 
xxxiii
 I. I. Vil’son, “O perepisi naseleniia S.-Peterburga 28-30 inavaria 1897 g.,” Izvestiia 
Imperatorskago Russkago Geograficheskago Obshchestva, T. XXXIII, Vypusk III (St. 
Petersburg, 1897): 271-83 (quote 273). 
xxxiv
 See the ad on page 5 of Kievlianin, no. 49 (18.II.97), in which a St. Petersburg firm 
offered to sell “MEDALI dlia uchastnikov v narodnoi PEREPISI” for the low low price of 75 k 
(1 r., 30 k. with ribbon). 
 38 
                                                                                 
xxxv
  Plandovskii, Narodnaia perepis’, 374.  On spinning the census as a heroic venture 
see, RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 219 (Priamurskaia oblast’), ll. 141-3ob, 194-94ob; N. I-v, 
“Vseobshchei perepis’,” Saratovskiia Gubernskiia Vedomosti, No. 3 (09.I.97): 2-3 (chast’ 
neofitsial’naia); “Nakanune perepisi,” Odesskiia novosti, No. 3868 (23.I.97): 3; Ivan Dudka, 
“Zametki schetchiki,” Enisei, Nos. 9-11, 13, 18 (19, 22, 24, 29.I.97), 2-3 and (09.II.97): 2-3; 
“Perepis’ v derevne. (Pis’mo iz Novotorzhskago uezda),” Nedeliia, No. 6 (09.II.97): 186-7.  
xxxvi
 “V vidu predstoiashchei perepisi,” Odesskii listok, No. 21 (23.I.97): 2; “Nakanune 
perepisi,” Odesskiia novosti, No. 3868 (23.I.97): 3; RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 206, ll. 5-11. 
xxxvii
 Glavnaia Perepisnaia Kommissiia, Predstoiashchaia pervaia vseobshchaia perepis’ 
naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii (St. Petersburg, 1896), 2. 
xxxviii
  RGIA f. 1290, op. 10,  d. 8, l. 179. 
xxxix
  Ibid. 
xl
  Ibid., d. 5, ll. 90ob-91. 
xli
  Ibid., l. 81; d. 6, ll. 15-16; d. 8, ll. 141-2; d. 22, ll. 10-22; d. 84, l. 52 (quote). 
xlii
  Ibid., d. 84, l. 49. 
xliii
  Ibid., l. 50. 
xliv
  See esp. Ibid., dd. 84, 101, 103, and Kotel'nikov, Istoriia proizvodstva i razrabotki 
vseobshchei perepisi. 
xlv
 RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 26. 
xlvi
  James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
xlvii
 See Huitième Session du Congrès de Statistique a St-Péterbourg.  Rapports et 
Résolutions (St. Petersburg, 1872). 
 39 
                                                                                 
xlviii
 PSZRI, IIIrd Series, No. 11803 (St. Petersburg, 1899), 397-402; RGIA f. 1290, op. 
10, d. 4, ll. 19-21; Kotel'nikov, Istoriia proizvodstva i razrabotki vseobshchei perepisi, 30. 
xlix
  RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 101, ll. 132-3.  In spite of Kaufman's belief that peasants 
equated maintenance of social estate with communal vitality, their responses to this question 
were ambiguous.  The census required peasants to register their social status under serfdom 
(state, crown or seigneurial peasants).  Many registrars found, however, that peasants could not 
(or would not) remember this distinction. Responses were so poor that these data could not be 
used.  See Ibid., d. 84, l. 60; d. 121, ll. 132-3; d. 126, l. 23. 
l
 Gregory L. Freeze, “The Soslovie (Estate) Paradigm and Russian Social History,” 
American Historical Review 91, no. 1 (1986): 11-36. 
li
  Ibid., d. 84, ll. 51-2. 
lii
  Kotel'nikov, Istoriia proizvodstva i razrabotki vseobshchei perepisi, 50-1. 
liii
  See discussion and list of proposed tables in RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 84, ll. 235-49.  
On the “fluid” nature of soslovie as a category see Freeze, “The Soslovie (Estate) Paradigm.” 
liv
 Peasants living on communal land belonged on Form A, and the MCC assumed, given 
literacy levels in this population, that enumerators would need to complete each of these forms 
themselves.  Form B recorded rural inhabitants living on private land.  Here the MCC assumed 
(erroneously as it turned out) that these inhabitants could complete their own forms.  Form V 
counted the urban population.  A desire to make the census at least somewhat comparable with 
previous revisions and use census data to update volost’ records explains the separation between 
A, B, and V. Constant queries from local census commissions as to “which form” for various 
settlement patterns demonstrated that the population was more mobile than anticipated and that 
 40 
                                                                                 
the traditional relationship between land tenure and soslovie no longer held (many peasants lived 
on private land and many non-peasants lived on communal land). 
lv
 Iubileinyi sbornik Tsentral'nago statisticheskago komiteta Ministerstva Vnutrennikh 
Del, 1863-1913 (St. Petersburg, 1913), 78. 
lvi
 RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 179, ll. 176-80; d. 230, l. 38. 
lvii
 Iubileinyi sbornik Tsentral'nago statisticheskago komiteta, 81-4. 
lviii
 Kotel'nikov, Istoriia proizvodstva i razrabotki vseobshchei perepisii, 78-9 (quote), 
110; RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 160, l. 7ob.; Freeze, “The Soslovie (Estate) Paradigm.” 
lix
 S. K. Patkanov, “Razrabotka dannykh o iazyke v Tsentral’nom Statisticheskom 
Komitete,” Istoricheskii vestnik 72 (June 1898): 985-1002. 
lx
  See correspondence in RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, dd. 25, 33.  The language list and count 
of forms to be translated into each portrays state conceptions of non-Russian development levels. 
lxi
 PSZRI, IIIrd Series, No. 11803, Article 1 (primechanie—398); RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, 
d. 5, ll.136-6ob, 172-4. 
lxii
  John W. Slocum, “Who, and When, Were the Inorodtsy? The Evolution of the 
Category of ‘Aliens’ in Imperial Russia,” The Russian Review 57 (April 1998): 173-90; RGIA f. 
1290, op. 10, d. 25, esp. l. 11.  For copies of the census forms in all of their translations see 
Glavnaia Perepisnaia Kommissiia, Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis’ naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii 
na osnovanii Vysochaishe utverzhdennago 5 iiunia 1895 goda.  Vypusk I.  Chast’ Obshchaia. 
lxiii
  RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 64, ll. 146ob-7. 
lxiv
 Theodore R. Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and 
Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 
1996). 
 41 
                                                                                 
lxv
  Great Russians comprised only 44.3% of the total population.  Adding Ukrainians 
(17.8%) created a clear majority.  See David Saunders, “Russia’s Ukrainian Policy (1847-1905): 
A Demographic Approach,” European History Quarterly 25 (1995): 181-208; Andreas Kappeler, 
“A ‘Small People’ of Twenty-five Million: The Ukrainians circa 1900,” Journal of Ukrainian 
Studies 18, nos. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1993): 85-92. 
lxvi
 RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 5, ll. 169-70; d. 38, l. 94 (quote). 
lxvii
 Ibid., d. 13, l. 36. 
lxviii
 On the “Ukrainian card” in Austro-Russian relations see A. Iu. Bakhturina, Politika 
Rossiiskoi Imperii v vostochnoi Galitsii v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow, 2000). 
lxix
 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF) f. 124, op. 6 (1897), d. 274. 
lxx
  RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 64, ll. 64ob-6; Kotel'nikov, Istoriia proizvodstva i razrabotki 
vseobshchei perepisi, 36-7. 
lxxi
  See, for example, RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 70, 97-9. 
lxxii
  See, for example, Ibid., l. 43; Weeks, “Between Rome and Tsargrad,” 88. 
lxxiii
 RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 70, ll. 64-5ob, 131-2ob, 239-40; GARF f. 102, 3-oe DP, d. 
194, ll. 23-6. 
lxxiv
  RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 60, ll. 1ob-2, 48-54. 
lxxv
 Ia. A. Pliushchevskii-Pliushchik, “Otchet upolnomochennago po Vysochaishemu 
poveleniiu, dlia ob”edineniia deistviia mestnykh uchrezhdenii po Pervoi Vseobshchei Perepisi 
Naseleniia 28 Ianvaria 1897 goda v Tverskoi, Iaroslavskoi i Kostromskoi guberniiakh,” 
Vremennik Tsentral’nago Statisticheskago Komiteta Ministerstva Vnutrennykh Del, No. 45 
(1898): 52-64.  Another version appeared as Suzhdeniia i tolki naroda ob odnodnevnoi perepisi 
 42 
                                                                                 
28-go ianvaria 1897 goda.  Materialy dlia istoriii pervoi vseobshchei perepisi narodonaseleniia 
(St. Petersburg, 1898). 
lxxvi
 Pliushchevskii-Pliushchik, “Otchet upolnomochennago po Vysochaishemu 
poveleniiu,” 53-57; RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 68, ll. 277-8.  The MCC resolved to correct lists for 
these areas during processing, but one suspects that, given the unforeseen difficulties that the 
processors encountered, this directive remained unfulfilled.  One might also wonder about the 
count of sects that practiced late baptism.  Did priest enumerators count those without a 
christened name? 
lxxvii
 TsSK, Raspredelenie naseleniia Imperii po glavnym veroispovedeniiam and 
Raspredelenie staroobradtsev i sektantov po tolkam i sektam (St. Petersburg, 1901); Gozulov, 
Perepisi naseleniia SSSR, 202-3; Kotel'nikov, Istoriia proizvodstva i razrabotki vseobshchei 
perepisi, 38. 
lxxviii
  Kotel'nikov, Istoriia proizvodstva i razrabotki vseobshchei perepisi, 39. 
lxxix
  A Soviet scholar argued that the census was in fact constructed to maximize the final 
count of Russian Orthodox inhabitants.  Gozulov, Perepisi naseleniia SSSR, 202-203; Brian D. 
Silver, "The Ethnic and Language Dimensions in Russian and Soviet Censuses," in Clem, ed., 
Research Guide to the Russian and Soviet Censuses, 73. 
lxxx
 Inaccessibility and non-Russian resistance, especially in Central Asia and the Far 
East, also contributed to error.  See reports on these issues from the southern Ussuri region in 
RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 46, ll. 68-9, 127. 
lxxxi
 Patkanov, “Razrabotka dannykh o iazyke,” 995, 999; RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 46, l. 
52. 
 43 
                                                                                 
lxxxii
 See Posobie pri razrabotke Pervoi Vseobshchei Perepisi naseleniia.  Nos. 1-16 (St 
Petersburg, 1898): Chast’ I, 58.  
lxxxiii
 RGIA f. 1290, op. 10, d. 22, l. 254. 
lxxxiv
 Ibid.; Ibid., d. 68, l. 181; Theodore R. Weeks, “The ‘End’ of the Uniate Church in 
Russia: The Vozsoedinenie of 1875,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 44 (1996): 29-39; 
TsSK, Obshchii svod po imperii rezultatov razrabotki dannykh pervoi vseobshchei perepisi 
naseleniia, proizvedennoi 28 ianvaria 1897 goda, 2 T. (St. Petersburg, 1905), Chast’ II, ii; 
Silver, “The Ethnic and Language Dimensions,” 72. 
lxxxv
  TsSK, Obshchii svod po imperii, Chast’ II, ii.  Gozulov claimed that data on native 
language over-represented the number of Russians in the population, especially as Udmurts, 
Mordvinians, Komi and others were undergoing linguistic Russification.  See Gozulov, Perepisi 
naseleniia SSSR i kapitalisticheskikh stran, 201-2 Silver, "The Ethnic and Language 
Dimensions," 72. 
